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O P I N I O N 
___________ 
                         
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
I.  Introduction 
This appeal concerns a dispute between the U.S. Forest 
Service (the Service) and owners of mineral rights in the 
Allegheny National Forest (ANF).  Although the Service 
manages the surface of the ANF for the United States, 
mineral rights in most of the ANF are privately owned.  
Mineral rights owners are entitled to reasonable use of the 
surface to drill for oil or gas and from 1980 until recently the 
Service and mineral owners had managed drilling in the ANF 
through a cooperative process.  Mineral rights owners would 
provide 60 days advance notice to the Service of their drilling 
plans and the Service would issue owners a Notice to Proceed 
(NTP), which acknowledged receipt of notice and 
memorialized any agreements between the Service and the 
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mineral owner about the drilling operations.  However, as a 
result of a settlement agreement with environmental groups, 
the Service dramatically changed its policy and decided to 
postpone the issuance of NTPs until a multi-year, forest-wide 
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is completed.   
 
Mineral owners and related businesses affected by this 
new policy sought to enjoin the Service from implementing 
the policy, which would halt new drilling in the ANF.  After 
holding a hearing and carefully considering the evidence, the 
District Court issued a preliminary injunction against the 
Service, prohibiting it from making the completion of the 
forest-wide EIS a condition for issuing NTPs and requiring it 
to return to its prior, cooperative process for issuing NTPs.  
The Service, the Attorney General, and several environmental 
organizations appeal the preliminary injunction, contending 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction and erred in issuing 
a preliminary injunction.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm in all respects the District Court‟s thorough, well-
reasoned opinion. 
 
II.  Background 
In the 19th century, all the land now comprising the 
ANF was privately owned.  In 1891, Congress authorized the 
President to designate federal lands as forest reservations in 
order to preserve valuable timber resources and ensure 
protection of watersheds.  Act of March 3, 1891 § 24, 26 Stat. 
1095, 1103, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed) (the 1891 
Act).  In 1897, Congress passed the Organic Act authorizing 
the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate “occupancy and use” 
of forest reservations designated under the 1891 Act.  30 Stat. 
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11, 34, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 475.  These Acts, however, did 
not authorize the purchase of land to establish federal forest 
reservations – they were limited to land already owned by the 
federal government or acquired for other purposes.  After 
considerable controversy and a decade of campaigning, see 
S. REP. NO. 60-459, at 13 (1908) (describing history of forest 
preservation bills), Congress passed the Weeks Act in 1911.  
Pub. L. No. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961.  The Act set aside funds for 
purchase of private land by the Secretary of Agriculture to 
serve as forest reservations under the Organic Act.  Id. §§ 4-8, 
36 Stat. at 962.  Before purchasing land in a State, the Act 
required the Secretary to obtain the State‟s consent.  Id. § 7, 
36 Stat. at 962.  In the decades following the Act, the 
Secretary purchased large tracts of forest land, and in 1923, 
President Coolidge designated the lands acquired in 
Pennsylvania as the Allegheny National Forest.  43 Stat. 
1925. 
 
 A.  Mineral Rights in the Allegheny National Forest 
Coal mining was common in the Allegheny Plateau 
and oil had been discovered in the area in 1859.  To acquire 
as much land as possible with limited funds, the Secretary of 
Agriculture purchased large tracts of surface estate in the 
ANF while leaving valuable mineral rights in private hands.  
As a result, over 93% of the mineral estates in the ANF are 
privately owned.  The mineral rights in the ANF are of two 
kinds:  reserved rights and outstanding rights.   
 
Reserved rights are those reserved by the fee owner in 
the deed conveying surface ownership to the United States.  
The Weeks Act authorized the Secretary to acquire surface 
estates with a reservation of rights to the grantor and provided 
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that the exercise of reserved rights would be subject to the 
“rules and regulations” promulgated by the Secretary and 
included in the instrument of conveyance.  16 U.S.C. § 518.  
Reserved rights are usually referred to by the year of 
promulgation of the regulations in effect at the time of federal 
acquisition, i.e., 1911, 1937, 1947, or 1963 reserved rights.  
About 48% of the mineral rights in the ANF are reserved 
rights and the vast majority of these are 1911 rights.  (J.A. 
157, 254-55.)  The 1911 regulations were quite minimal, and 
generally required mineral rights owners to use no more of 
the surface than reasonably necessary, pay for any timber cut 
down when clearing space for wells, take appropriate 
measures to prevent fire, and remove all facilities or refuse 
when drilling operations cease.
1
  The 1911 regulations did not 
                                              
1
 These regulations essentially required mineral rights 
owners to do the following: 
(1) Furnish proof of mineral rights ownership upon 
demand by the Service, 
(2) Use only so much of the surface as is necessary for 
mining operations, 
(3) Take all reasonable and usual precautions in making 
tunnels and shafts to support surface land, subject to 
inspection by the Service or other federal officials, 
(4) Pay (at locally prevailing rates) for timber cut, 
destroyed, or damaged in mining operations, 
(5) Remove all buildings, camps, or equipment within six 
months after completion or abandonment of mining 
operations, 
(6) Dispose of destructible refuse interfering with forest 
administration within six months after completion or 
abandonment of mining operations, and 
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require mineral rights owners to obtain a permit from the 
Service in order to exercise their mineral rights.   
 
Outstanding rights are those that were severed from 
the surface estate prior to its conveyance to the United States.  
The Weeks Act was amended in 1913 to permit acquisition of 
severed surface estates with outstanding mineral rights, 
provided that the National Forest Reservation Commission 
concluded that these rights would not hinder administration of 
the forest reservation.  37 Stat. 828, 855 (1913).  Until 
recently, the Service maintained that its regulations did not 
apply to outstanding mineral rights.
2
  Rather, because 
outstanding mineral rights were reserved prior to conveyance 
to the United States, these rights are governed by the terms of 
the earlier conveyance severing the mineral rights and 
Pennsylvania property law.  See United States v. Minard Run 
Oil Co., No. 90-12, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9570, at *14-15 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1980) (Minard Run I).   
 
                                                                                                     
(7) Use “due diligence” to avoid or suppress fires in the 
area. 
Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 09-125, 2009 
WL 4937785, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2009) (Minard Run 
II). 
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 For example, the Forest Service Manual (FSM) states 
that “[t]he Secretary's rules and regulations do not apply to 
the administration of outstanding mineral rights.”  FSM § 
2830.1  The Service‟s 1984 ANF Handbook similarly states 
that outstanding mineral rights “are not subject to any of the 
Secretary of Agriculture‟s rules and regulations.”  ANF 
Handbook, ch. 2, p.11 (1984) (emphasis in original). 
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Under Pennsylvania law, the mineral estate is the 
dominant estate and entails the right to use of as much surface 
land as reasonably necessary to extract minerals.  Belden & 
Blake Corp. v. DCNR, 969 A.2d 528, 532 (Pa. 2009).  
Although the mineral owner must show “due regard” to the 
rights of the surface owner, the mineral owner need not obtain 
consent or approval before entering land to mine for minerals.  
Id. at 533; see also Minard Run I, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9570, at *13 (mineral rights owner has an “unquestioned 
right” to enter the property, subject to “minor restrictions 
which . . . should not seriously hamper the extraction of oil 
and gas”).  Minard Run I concluded that “due regard” to the 
Service as surface owner required owners of outstanding 
mineral rights to provide information regarding drilling plans 
to the Service “no less than 60 days in advance” of 
commencing drilling operations.  Id. at *22. 
 
The Service‟s 1984 ANF Handbook incorporated the 
Minard Run I framework into its “standard operating 
procedures” for outstanding mineral rights in the ANF.  
Congress codified the notice provisions of Minard Run I in 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486 § 2508, 
106 Stat. 2776, 3108, codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(o).  Until 
the change in policy that is the subject of this litigation, the 
Service and mineral rights owners in the ANF had relied on 
the Minard Run I framework and taken a cooperative 
approach to oil and gas drilling in the ANF.  Under this 
framework, mineral rights owners who planned to conduct 
drilling operations would provide the Service with the 
required notice and the two parties would then negotiate the 
details of drilling operations, such as the location of wells or 
access roads, so as to prevent any unnecessary surface use.  
At the end of this process, the Service would issue a Notice to 
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Proceed (NTP) to the mineral rights owner, which 
acknowledged receipt of notice from the mineral rights owner 
and memorialized any agreements between the parties 
regarding drilling operations.
3
   
 
B.  The Service’s Policy Regarding NEPA and Split 
Estates 
 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (NEPA) requires federal agencies 
to file an environmental impact study (EIS) before taking any 
“major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment.”  42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).  The Service 
completed EISs in 1986 and 2007 in connection with 
adoption of a Forest Plan for the ANF, which governs the 
Service‟s management of the forest.  The Service did not 
suspend the issuance of NTPs during these EISs. The Service 
also occasionally conducted an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) – a summary environmental analysis less demanding 
than an EIS – when issuing certain NTPs.  Although only 
limited information on these EAs is available, they appear to 
have been completed quite promptly and within the 60-day 
Minard Run I framework.  However, until recently, the 
Service took the position that issuance of an NTP to a mineral 
rights owner was not a “major federal action” requiring 
environmental analysis under NEPA because the Service‟s 
                                              
3
Drilling in the ANF is regulated by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and subject 
to a permit process, see 25 Pa. Stat. §§ 77.51, 78.1, 86.11.  A 
permit is usually obtained before applying for an NTP.  As an 
affected landowner, the Service has the right to participate in 
the permit process and challenge the terms of a permit.   
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rights as surface owner were so limited.  (J.A. 182-83 
(testimony before Congress), 185-86 (legal opinion provided 
to Congress).)  When interacting with mineral rights owners 
in the ANF, the Service viewed itself as a resource 
management agency negotiating use of jointly owned land, 
not as a regulatory agency issuing permits.   
 
C.  Changes in Forest Service Policy 
Several changes in the Service‟s policy led to this 
litigation.  On May 24, 2007, an attorney in the Service‟s 
Office of General Counsel authored a memorandum 
concluding that the issuance of an NTP is a “major federal 
action” subject to NEPA.  The memo relied heavily on 
Duncan Energy Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, 109 F.3d 497 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (Duncan I), and adopted a broader interpretation of 
the Service‟s authority over 1911 reserved rights than was 
adopted in Minard Run I, which the memorandum cited only 
once and did not discuss.  However, there was no immediate 
change in the Service‟s policy in response to this 
memorandum.   
 
On November 20, 2008, the Forest Service Employees 
for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE) and the Sierra Club filed 
suit against the Service seeking a declaration that its practice 
of issuing NTPs without conducting an appropriate 
environmental analysis under NEPA was contrary to law and 
also seeking an injunction against issuance of further NTPs 
without proper NEPA analysis.  See FSEEE v. U.S. Forest 
Service, No. 08-323, 2009 WL 1324154 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 
2009).  On January 16, 2009, while the action was still 
pending, the Service ceased processing and issuing NTPs, 
explaining that this was being done “[i]n light of pending 
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litigation” and that the Service intended to file a Notice of 
Intent to prepare an EIS the following month.  On April 9, 
2009, the parties to the FSEEE litigation entered into a 
Settlement Agreement purporting to resolve all claims.  The 
Settlement Agreement provided that, with the exception of 54 
grandfathered NTP applications,  
 
[the Service] agrees that it shall undertake 
appropriate NEPA analysis prior to issuing 
Notices to Proceed, or any other instrument 
authorizing access to and surface occupancy of 
the Forest for oil and gas projects on split 
estates including both reserved and outstanding 
mineral interests.  Appropriate NEPA analysis 
shall consist of the use of a categorical 
exclusion or the preparation of an 
Environmental Assessment or an 
Environmental Impact Assessment. 
The Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association 
(PIOGA) and the Allegheny Forest Alliance (AFA), both 
appellees in this action, were not included in the settlement 
negotiations but sought to intervene in the case once they 
learned that the case might settle.  Although PIOGA and AFA 
were permitted to intervene in the FSEEE action, the district 
court declined to consider their objections to the settlement 
and approved voluntary dismissal of the case.  FSEEE, 2009 
WL 1324154, at *4. 
 
On April 10, 2009, ANF Forest Supervisor Leanne 
Marten issued a statement (the Marten Statement) explaining 
that, because of the Settlement Agreement, “[a]ll . . . pending 
oil and gas proposals, and all future proposals, will be 
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processed after the appropriate level of environmental 
analysis has been conducted under the NEPA.”  Marten 
announced that the Service would be “initiating a forest-wide 
site specific environmental analysis for proposals that were 
not included in the settlement and any other proposals for 
activity anticipated between now and 2013,” and that this 
process was estimated to take until at least mid-April 2010.  
Aside from the 54 NTP applications identified in the 
Settlement Agreement, no new drilling in the ANF would be 
authorized until the forest-wide EIS was complete.   
 
As these policy changes were taking place, the Service 
took the position that mineral rights owners were required to 
obtain an NTP prior to making any changes to land in the 
ANF.  For example, in a 2008 letter, the Service advised a 
mineral rights owner that “entry upon, and removal of, timber 
from National Forest System lands requires the express prior 
written approval of the Forest Service” and that “[f]ailure to 
do so is a violation of both federal and state law and federal 
regulation.”  The Service directed the recipient‟s “considered 
attention” to several statutes imposing criminal penalties for 
failure to abide by Service regulations.  Since the Settlement 
Agreement and the Marten Statement, the Service has warned 
mineral rights owners and their contractors on several 
occasions that new drilling operations without an NTP are not 
permitted and may result in criminal penalties.  Although the 
Service does not appear to have formally adopted a rule to 
this effect, it has acknowledged that new drilling without an 




D.  Litigation 
On June 1, 2009, PIOGA, AFA, Minard Run Oil 
Company, and the County of Warren brought suit against the 
Service and three of its officers, the Attorney General, 
FSEEE, the Sierra Club, and the Allegheny Defense Fund.  
The plaintiffs‟ complaint alleged that, as a result of the 
Settlement Agreement, the Service had imposed a de facto 
drilling ban in the ANF until a forest-wide EIS is completed 
and that this ban exceeded the authority of the Service and 
was contrary to NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).  Additionally, plaintiffs allege that because the 
Service‟s estimated completion date for its forest-wide EIS – 
April 2010 – is unrealistic, the EIS will probably not be 
completed for several years.  As a result, mineral rights 
owners will be prevented from exercising their property rights 
during this period, resulting in damage to the owners, related 
businesses, and the local community.   
 
At a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion, 
plaintiffs presented the testimony of several business owners, 
who testified that, as a result of the Service‟s ban on new 
drilling, they were prevented from drilling new wells, causing 
significant losses to their businesses and harm to the 
community.  Plaintiffs also presented testimony from several 
former Forest Rangers who had worked in the ANF, who 
described the Service‟s historical practices regarding NTPs 
and EISs and estimated that the EIS would probably require 
at least several years to complete.   
 
The Service presented the testimony of ANF Forest 
Supervisor Leanne Marten and Forest Ranger Richard 
Scardina.  These witnesses claimed that, starting in 2007, 
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there was a significant increase in the number of NTP 
applications.  They explained that a forest-wide EIS is 
necessary before approving any new NTPs, because the 
Service‟s prior policy of individualized assessment of NTP 
applications has hindered forest management, resulting in 
duplicative roads or development facilities for adjoining 
pieces of land, and unnecessary clearing of the forest.  The 
environmental defendants presented the testimony of two 
members of local environmental organizations who claimed 
that the natural beauty of the ANF had been impaired by oil 
and gas drilling.  Plaintiffs disputed much of this testimony 
and presented rebuttal witnesses.   
 
The District Court granted plaintiffs‟ motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  The court found as follows:  The 
Settlement Agreement and the Marten Statement represented 
“a fundamental „sea change‟” in the Service‟s policy; 
therefore, they constituted final agency action subject to 
review under the APA.  Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest 
Service, No. 09-125, 2009 WL 4937785, at *22 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 15, 2009) (Minard Run II).  The effect of this policy was 
a “drilling ban,” which precluded new drilling in the ANF 
(with the exception of the 54 grandfathered NTP applications) 
until the Service completed a forest-wide EIS.  Id. at *14-15.  
The Service had instituted the drilling ban without following 
the APA‟s notice and comment procedures, and the ban was 
not justified under NEPA because the issuing of an NTP was 
not a major federal action.  The preparation of the EIS would 
likely last several years, resulting in irreparable harm to the 
plaintiffs, and the balance of the equities and the public 
interest favored an injunction.  Id. at *32-33.   
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The District Court then enjoined the Service “from 
requiring the preparation of a NEPA document as a 
precondition to the exercise of private oil and gas rights in the 
ANF,” and required the Service to return to the 60-day 
cooperative framework for processing NTPs that had been in 
place prior to the FSEEE Settlement.  Id.  The preliminary 
injunction was entered on December 15, 2009.  The District 
Court denied appellants‟ motion for reconsideration on March 
9, 2010, and this appeal followed.   
 
II.  Jurisdiction 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1).  The Service argued that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction because there is no final agency action subject to 
review.
4
  Because final agency action is a jurisdictional issue, 
                                              
4
The environmental appellants also claim that 
appellees lack standing to challenge the Settlement 
Agreement because it did not cause them any harm and 
suspending its application would not redress any injury 
allegedly suffered by appellees.  See Freeman v. Corzine, 629 
F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2010) (constitutional standing requires 
(1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability).  We 
disagree.  As the District Court found, the Marten Statement 
is the direct result of the Settlement Agreement – its first 
sentence describes the terms of the Agreement.  Even if the 
environmental appellants are correct that the Agreement does 
not require the multi-year EIS that the Service has chosen to 
implement prior to issuing NTPs, the Agreement nevertheless 
establishes – in violation of appellees‟ notice and comment 
rights – a new substantive rule on the issuance of NTPs that 
could delay issuance of NTPs to appellees.  This suffices for 
17 
TSG Inc. v. EPA, 538 F.3d 264, 267 (3d Cir. 2008), we 
review de novo the District Court‟s finding of final agency 
action, Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 63 
(3d Cir. 2008).  The APA provides for judicial review of 
“final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 702, which is present when 
two conditions are met: 
 
First, the action must mark the “consummation” 
of the agency‟s decisionmaking process – it 
must not be of a merely tentative or 
interlocutory nature.  And second, the action 
must be one by which “rights or obligations 
have been determined,” or from which “legal 
consequences will flow.” 
TSG Inc., 538 F.3d at 267 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 178 (1997)).  We conclude that the Marten Statement 
constitutes final agency action. 
 
First, the Marten Statement represents the 
consummation of the Service‟s decisionmaking process on 
the specific question of whether to issue NTPs while the 
Service is conducting a lengthy EIS.  The Service argues that 
this decision is “interlocutory,” TSG Inc., 538 F.3d at 267, or 
a “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action,” 5 
U.S.C. § 704, which will not be final until the EIS is complete 
and NTPs are issued.  We agree with the Service that the 
completion of the EIS or issuance of an NTP would constitute 
final agency action, but that does not mean that any 
                                                                                                     
standing purposes.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
518 (2007); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 
n.8 (1992). 
18 
determinations made by the Service prior to these actions are 
not final.  An agency determination of a particular issue that 
will not be reconsidered in subsequent agency proceedings 
may represent the consummation of the agency‟s 
decisionmaking process on that issue.  Compare Fairbanks 
North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 543 
F.3d 586, 591 -592 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding of Clean Water 
Act jurisdiction was consummation of decisionmaking 
process on jurisdiction because subsequent regulatory 
proceedings would not revisit this determination) with In re 
Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Litig., 
340 F.3d 749, 756 (8th Cir. 2003) (temporary closure order 
not final because order was preliminary and subject to further 
administrative review).
5
  The Service does not claim that it 
will revisit the propriety of imposing a moratorium on new 
drilling in the ANF during the forest-wide EIS, and by the 
time the EIS is completed, the propriety of the moratorium 
will be moot.  Accordingly, the Marten Statement represents 
the consummation of the Service‟s decisionmaking process 
with respect to the moratorium on new drilling. 
                                              
5
 The Service points out that the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately found no final agency action in Fairbanks.  543 
F.3d at 593-94.  However, this holding rested on the second 
Bennett factor – whether agency action has concrete legal 
consequences.  Id.  The jurisdictional finding at issue in 
Fairbanks did not affect rights and obligations because “[i]t 
does not itself command Fairbanks to do or forbear from 
anything; as a bare statement of the agency‟s opinion, it can 
be neither the subject of „immediate compliance‟ nor of 
defiance.”  Id.  As we explain below, this is not true of the 




Second, the Service‟s moratorium on new drilling has 
significant legal consequences for mineral rights owners:  
they must stop all new drilling or face criminal penalties.  See 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967) (finding 
final agency action “where a regulation requires an immediate 
and significant change in the plaintiffs‟ conduct of their 
affairs with serious penalties attached to noncompliance”).  
The Service contends that its moratorium on new drilling is 
analogous to a merely procedural or jurisdictional 
determination that has the incidental effect of delaying 
agency proceedings.  We disagree.  As the District Court 
found, the moratorium represents a “sea change” in the 
Service‟s policy regarding mineral rights that directly 
prohibits mineral rights owners from engaging in new 
drilling, under threat of criminal penalties.  Minard Run II, 
2009 WL 4937785, at *22.  The burden imposed by the 
moratorium goes far beyond “the expense and annoyance of 
litigation [that] is part of the social burden of living under 
government.” FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 238, 
244 (1980) (filing of complaint commencing agency 
enforcement action was not final agency action); see also 
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 47 
(1938) (agency decision to hold hearing is not reviewable); 
Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 
69 (3d Cir. 2003) (initiation of audit not final agency action); 
Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. DOI, 180 F.3d 
1192, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1999) (letter requesting information 
not final agency action).  Nor is this a case in which an 
agency‟s procedural determinations have the incidental effect 
of delaying the acquisition of a concededly necessary 
regulatory decision.  See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. United 
States, 790 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (ICC assertion of 
20 
original jurisdiction that would require more “costly and 
time-consuming proceedings” than alternative review method 
was not final agency action).  Rather, the purpose of the 
Service‟s change in policy is to suspend new drilling and its 
authority to do so is precisely what is at issue here. 
 
Finally, we note that final agency action “is to be given 
a pragmatic definition.”  Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895, 
901-02 (3d Cir. 1978).  We have identified a number of 
pragmatic considerations relevant to whether agency action is 
final: 
 
(1) whether the decision represents the agency‟s 
definitive position on the question; (2) whether 
the decision has the status of law with the 
expectation of immediate compliance; (3) 
whether the decision has immediate impact on 
the day-to-day operations of the party seeking 
review; (4) whether the decision involves a pure 
question of law that does not require further 
factual development; and (5) whether 
immediate judicial review would speed 
enforcement of the relevant act. 
Corrigan, 347 F.3d at 69 n.7.  Each of these considerations 
favors a finding of finality here.  The Marten Statement 
represents the Service‟s final position on the need for a 
drilling moratorium, which will not be revisited in subsequent 
proceedings.  It is evident that the Service expects mineral 
owners to refrain from new drilling during the moratorium 
and has threatened criminal enforcement against mineral 
owners who proceed with drilling without an NTP.  The 
moratorium on new drilling directly affects the daily 
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operations of mineral owners and related businesses and has 
already caused them significant losses.  Whether the Service‟s 
moratorium is required by NEPA and consistent with the 
APA are pure questions of law that require no further factual 
development.  Finally, our review of the claims presented 
here will facilitate a prompt and efficient resolution of 
questions regarding the scope of the Service‟s authority over 
private mineral rights in the ANF and its obligations under 
NEPA.
6
  We therefore conclude that the Service‟s 
moratorium on new drilling in the ANF, as reflected in the 
Settlement Agreement and the Marten Statement, constitutes 
final agency action.
7
  Accordingly, the District Court had 
                                              
6
 We note that a number of mineral owners have 
brought individual challenges to NTPs recently issued by the 
Service, which raise many of the same issues presented in this 
case.  See Duhring Resource Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 07-
314 (W.D. Pa.); Catalyst Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
No. 09-70 (W.D. Pa.); Seneca Res. Corp. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
No. 09-154 (W.D. Pa.).   In each of these cases, a mineral 
rights owner contends that the Service has violated its 
property rights and constitutional rights by prohibiting oil and 
gas development without an NTP, delaying the issuance of 
his NTP beyond 60 days, and imposing unreasonable 
conditions in the NTP.  Because these cases challenge NTPs 
already issued, there is little question that there is final agency 
action in each of these cases.  However, we believe that the 
issues presented both in those cases and in this appeal are 
better resolved comprehensively in this appeal rather than 
addressing them piecemeal in a series of cases. 
7
 Strictly speaking, the Marten Statement is final 
agency action, and the Settlement Agreement is an 
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jurisdiction in this case and we turn to the merits of its 
decision. 
 
III.  The Preliminary Injunction 
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must 
show:  “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it 
will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) 
that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater 
harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest 
favors such relief.”  Kos Pharm. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 
700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).  In reviewing a preliminary 
injunction, we “exercise plenary review over the district 
court‟s conclusions of law and its application of law to the 
facts, but review its findings of fact for clear error.”  Id.  We 
review the court‟s ultimate decision to issue an injunction for 
abuse of discretion.  See Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 
1761 (2009); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & 
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co., 290 F.3d 
578, 595 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
A.  Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
The District Court found that appellees were likely to 
prevail on the merits of two claims:  (1) issuance of an NTP is 
not a major federal action for which prior NEPA analysis is 
required, and (2) the Settlement Agreement and the Marten 
Statement are substantive rules that were not preceded by 
notice and comment procedures as required by the APA.  We 
consider each in turn. 
                                                                                                     
“intermediate agency action” which is “subject to review on 
the review of the final agency action.”  5 U.S.C. § 704. 
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1.  Whether Issuance of an NTP Must be 
Preceded by NEPA Analysis 
 
The merits of appellees‟ first claim turns on whether 
the issuance of an NTP is a “major federal action[] 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” 
which under NEPA must be preceded by an appropriate 
environmental analysis.  42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).  We have 
identified three types of agency action that typically 
constitute “major federal action”:  “first, where the agency 
itself undertook a project; second, where the agency 
supported a project by contract, grant, loan, or other financial 
assistance; and third, where the agency enabled the project by 
lease, license, permit, or other entitlement for use.”  N.J. 
Dept. of Envt’l. Prot. and Energy v. Long Island Power Auth., 
30 F.3d 403, 417 (3d Cir. 1994).  But “[f]ederal approval of a 
private party‟s project, where that approval is not required for 
the project to go forward, does not constitute a major federal 
action.”  Id.; see also Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 
1310 (9th Cir. 1988).  Accordingly, the dispositive question is 
whether mineral owners are required to obtain the approval of 
the Service, in the form of an NTP, before drilling in the 
ANF.  We conclude that such approval is not necessary. 
 
The Service points out that Congress has broad 
authority under the Property Clause of the Constitution to 
regulate land owned by the federal government as well as use 
of private land that affects federal land.  See Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).  Congress has also 
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authorized the Service to regulate use of national forests.
8
  
The Organic Act authorizes the Service “to make such rules 
and regulations . . . as will insure the objects of [forest] 
reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and 
to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.”  16 U.S.C. § 
551.  “Special use regulations” promulgated under the Act 
provide that “all uses of National Forest System land . . . are 
designated „special uses‟ and must be approved by an 
authorized officer.”  36 C.F.R. § 251.50(a).  The Service 
argues that drilling by mineral owners in the ANF is a 
“special use” subject to its approval.  See Duncan Energy v. 
U.S. Forest Service, 50 F.3d 584, 589 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(Duncan I) (special use regulations apply to mineral owners‟ 
access to land purchased under the Bankhead-Jones Farm 
Tenant Act). 
 
We disagree.  As a preliminary matter, we note that the 
Service‟s regulatory authority over Weeks Act land is not as 
straightforward as it claims.  The Organic Act‟s grant of 
regulatory authority applies to “the public forests and national 
forests which may have been set aside or which may be 
hereafter set aside under section 471 of this title.”  16 U.S.C. 
§ 551.  Section 471 (now repealed) authorized the President 
to designate already owned federal lands as national forests, 
but did not authorize the purchase of private land, including 
land with reserved or outstanding rights.  16 U.S.C. 471, 
repealed by Pub. L. 94–579, title VII, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 
(1976).  When the Organic Act was passed, the regulation of 
                                              
8
The statutes authorize regulation by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, who has delegated much of his statutory 
authority over the national forests to the Chief of the Forest 
Service.  See 7 C.F.R. § 2.60. 
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“occupancy and use” did not contemplate the regulation of 
access by a cotenant.   
 
The Weeks Act was the first law to authorize federal 
acquisition of private land for forest preservation.  It provides 
that land acquired under the Act “shall be permanently 
reserved, held, and administered as national forest lands 
under the provisions of section 471 of this title,” 16 U.S.C. § 
521.  This provision “arguably requires treating such land as 
if it had been reserved under section 471” and could therefore 
be subject to the Service‟s regulatory authority under the 
Organic Act.  United States v. Srnsky, 271 F.3d 595, 601 (4th 
Cir. 2001).  However, even if Congress meant by this 
language to subject Weeks Act land to the Service‟s 
regulatory authority under the Act, it intended to authorize the 
Service to regulate the exercise of reserved or outstanding 
rights by a joint owner of Weeks Act land. 
 
Indeed, section 9 of the Weeks Act suggests that this 
was not Congress‟s intent.  Section 9 governs the acquisition 
of forest land, and provides: 
 
Such acquisition by the United States shall in 
no case be defeated because of located or 
defined rights of way, easements, and 
reservations, which, from their nature will, in 
the opinion of the Secretary of Agriculture, in 
no manner interfere with the use of the lands so 
encumbered, for the purposes of this Act. Such 
rights of way, easements, and reservations 
retained by the owner from whom the United 
States receives title, shall be subject to the rules 
and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of 
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Agriculture for their occupation, use, operation, 
protection, and administration, and such rules 
and regulations shall be expressed in and made 
part of the written instrument conveying title to 
the lands to the United States; and the use, 
occupation, and operation of such rights of way, 
easements, and reservations shall be under, 
subject to, and in obedience with the rules and 
regulations so expressed. 
16 U.S.C. § 518 (emphasis added).  Thus, under section 9, 
reserved rights – “rights of way, easements, and reservations 
retained by the owner from whom the United States receives 
title” – are subject to the regulations “expressed in and made 
part of the written instrument conveying title to the lands to 
the United States.”  Id.   
 
The Service points out that nothing in this provision 
provides that reserved mineral rights are subject only to 
regulations in the instrument of conveyance – it is possible 
that reserved rights are subject to the Service regulations 
contained in the written instrument of conveyance and to 
other regulations not contained in the instrument.  There are 
two problems with this interpretation.  First, it renders the 
provision superfluous:  Congress would not have mandated 
the inclusion of regulations in deeds with reserved rights if 
those rights were subject to all generally applicable Service 
regulations – the general regulatory authority granted under 
the Organic Act would have been sufficient.  See Massie v. 
U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 340, 352 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“a core tenet of statutory interpretation [is] 
that no provision shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); In re Philadelphia 
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Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 307 (3d Cir. 2010) (warning 
against “applying a general provision when doing so would 
undermine limitations created by a more specific provision”).   
 
Second, as the Fourth Circuit noted in Srnsky, the 
regulatory authority claimed by the Service “has no logical 
stopping point” and would therefore raise difficult 
constitutional questions.  271 F.3d at 604.  For example, on 
the Service‟s view, it would have the authority to require any 
holder of reserved rights of any kind – even an easement or 
right of way – to obtain a permit prior to exercising their 
rights.  This would effectively “wipe the National Forest 
System clean of any and all easements, implied or express” 
and dramatically reduce the value of reserved mineral and 
timber rights.  Id.  We do not believe that this is what 
Congress intended, and, like the Fourth Circuit, we are 
reluctant to construe the Weeks Act “„in a manner that could 
in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive 
questions arising out of the guarantees of the takings clause.‟”  
Id. (quoting United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 
70, 82 (1982)).  The better reading of the Weeks Act is that it 
“require[s] that any rules or regulations that the Secretary 
wishes to apply to easements reserved by the grantor must be 
„expressed in and made part of‟ the instrument of 
conveyance.”  Srnsky, 271 F.3d at 602. 
 
These considerations apply with even greater force to 
outstanding rights.  Although the Weeks Act contains no 
limiting language regarding the regulations applicable to 
outstanding rights, this is because outstanding rights are 
created prior to conveyance to the United States and there is 
no opportunity to limit these rights by inserting regulations 
into the instrument defining these rights.  Moreover, the 
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language of the Weeks Act indicates that Congress expected 
the United States to be bound by the terms of outstanding 
rights – purchase of land with outstanding rights is permitted 
only where such rights “from their nature will, in the opinion 
of the Secretary of Agriculture, in no manner interfere with 
the use of the lands so encumbered, for the purposes of this 
Act.”  16 U.S.C. § 518.  This limitation only makes sense if 
the Service is bound by the terms of outstanding rights and 
cannot simply invoke its regulatory authority to override any 
private use of outstanding rights that it considers inconsistent 
with the purposes of the Weeks Act.  Additionally, as with 
reserved rights, we are reluctant to construe the Weeks Act in 
a manner raising difficult constitutional takings questions 




As the District Court recognized, Duncan Energy Co. 
v. U.S. Forest Service, 50 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1997) (Duncan I) 
does not support the Service‟s broad claim of regulatory 
                                              
9
 The Service‟s construction of the Weeks Act and the 
Organic Act as conferring regulatory authority over 
outstanding rights is not entitled to deference.  This 
interpretation was adopted in a 2007 General Counsel opinion 
(J.A. 380-83 & n.5), not in a formal adjudicatory or 
rulemaking proceeding, and thus is not entitled to Chevron 
deference.  See De Leon-Ochoa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 
341, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).  Even Skidmore deference is 
unwarranted here, because the Service‟s current interpretation 
is an unexplained departure from its longstanding view that 
its regulations do not apply to outstanding mineral rights.  See 




  In Ducan I, the Eighth Circuit held that a private 
mineral rights owner seeking to drill in a national forest 
acquired under the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 50 Stat. 
525 (1937) (BJFTA), codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 
1010, et seq., was required to obtain authorization from the 
Service before beginning mining operations.  50 F.3d at 589-
91.  The court acknowledged that the mineral rights owner 
had a right under state law to reasonable use of the surface 
estate and thus the Service did not have “veto authority” over 
mineral rights owners‟ surface use.  Id. at 589.  But the 
Service‟s “special use regulations” governed surface use by 
mineral rights owners and empowered it to determine whether 
an owner‟s proposed surface use was reasonable.  Id. at 590-
91.  To respect the rights of the mineral owner, the Service 
was required to process requests for surface use within a 
reasonable time – generally 60 days.  Id.; see also Duncan 
Energy Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 109 F.3d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 
1997) (Duncan II) (clarifying that an inflexible 60-day limit 
was not required).  The court found that this rule was 
                                              
10
 The Fifth Circuit‟s recent decision in Dunn-
McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Service, 
630 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2011), is also inapposite.  That case 
considered land acquired under the Enabling Act of 1962, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 459d-459d-7, not under the Weeks Act, and the 
question presented by the case was whether a Texas statute 
consenting to federal acquisition of the land protected both 
reserved and outstanding rights.  Id. at 433.  The Fifth Circuit 
found that the plain language of the consent statute extended 
only to reserved rights, but not outstanding rights.  Id. at 436-
37.  Because the language of the Texas statute is different 
from the relevant provision of the Weeks Act, this case is not 
relevant. 
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consistent with North Dakota law.  Duncan I, 50 F.3d at 591-
92.   
 
Duncan I is inapposite for several reasons.  First, the 
land at issue in Duncan I was not acquired under the Weeks 
Act, but under BJFTA, which does not contain the limiting 
language of the Weeks Act discussed above.  Compare Pub. 
L. No. 75-210, 32(a), 50 Stat. 522, 525-26 (1937) with 16 
U.S.C. 518.  Second, Duncan I found that the authority 
asserted by the Service was consistent with the rights of 
mineral owners under North Dakota property law.  Here, by 
contrast, Pennsylvania law is flatly inconsistent with the 
authority asserted by the Service.  In a case very similar to 
this one, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected a claim by 
the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation of Natural 
Resources that, as surface owner, it could “impose conditions 
restraining those exercising their rights to the subsurface.”  
Belden & Blake Corp., 969 A.2d at 532.  The Court explicitly 
held that a surface owner has no right to determine what 
constitutes reasonable use in the first instance, and a mineral 
rights owner is under no obligation to obtain the surface 
owner‟s approval prior to accessing the surface to extract 
mineral rights.  Id.  Third, the Service‟s multi-year 
moratorium on new drilling could not be justified even under 
the Eighth Circuit‟s rulings in Duncan I and Duncan II.  In 
Duncan II, the Eighth Circuit held that the Service must be 
accorded some flexibility in issuing permits and could not be 
held to a strict, 60-day limit.  109 F.3d at 501.  But the 
indefinite suspension of NTPs for several years goes far 
beyond the type of delay contemplated in Duncan II.  See 109 
F.3d at 500 n.1 (mineral rights owner‟s applications for 
surface access were processed in 61, 74, and 90 days and that 
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owner had improperly taken unilateral action when 




In sum, the Service does not have the broad authority it 
claims over private mineral rights owners‟ access to surface 
lands.  Its special use regulations do not apply to outstanding 
rights and the limited regulatory scheme applicable to the vast 
majority of reserved rights in the ANF does not impose a 
permit requirement.
12
  Although the Service is entitled to 
                                              
11
 Because we find that the Service does not have the 
regulatory authority it claims under the Organic Act and 
Weeks Act, we need not consider the Service‟s arguments 
that federal common law would govern the United States‟ 
property rights or that federal law preempted state property 
law.  See Duncan I, 50 F.3d at 591.  In any case, the Service 
waived these arguments when it conceded before the District 
Court that Pennsylvania law was not preempted and argued 
that its new drilling moratorium was consistent with 
Pennsylvania law.  (J.A. 647-48, 1393-95); Minard Run II, 
2009 WL 4937785,  at *13. 
12
 The vast majority of the reserved mineral rights in 
the ANF are 1911 rights, which the District Court found do 
not impose a permit requirement or empower the Service to 
unilaterally determine what constitutes reasonable surface 
use.  Minard Run II, 2009 WL 4937785,  at *3.  The Service 
claims that some versions of the 1911 regulations require its 
approval of the location of access roads and buildings.  
(Appellant‟s Br. 44 (citing J.A. 384-86, 449, 454, 2421-28).)  
However, the Service‟s 1984 ANF Handbook states that 1911 
rights do not impose a permit requirement (J.A. 255), and 
appellees‟ expert opined without contradiction that the seven-
section version of the 1911 regulations considered by the 
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notice from owners of these mineral rights prior to surface 
access, and may request and negotiate accommodation of its 
state-law right to due regard, its approval is not required for 
surface access.  An NTP is an acknowledgment that 
memorializes any agreements between the Service and a 
mineral rights owner, but it is not a permit.  Accordingly, on 
the record before it, the District Court properly concluded that 
issuance of an NTP is not a “major federal action” under 
NEPA and an EIS need not be completed prior to issuing an 
NTP.  See Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th 
Cir. 1988); Long Island Power Auth., 30 F.3d at 417.  The 
court therefore correctly determined that appellees were likely 
to succeed on their claim that NEPA does not require the 
Service to conduct an environmental analysis prior to issuing 
an NTP. 
 
2.  Whether the APA Requires Notice and 
Comment Prior to Implementation of the Service’s 
Policy on Issuance of NTPs 
 
The APA requires an agency to provide public notice 
and an opportunity to comment before promulgating a 
legislative or substantive rule.  See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-(c); 
                                                                                                     
District Court, which does not require Service approval of 
roads or locations, was the “standard version.”  (J.A. 160.)  
The only deed included in the record by either party also 
contains this version of the rules.  (J.A. 276.)  The court 
therefore did not commit clear error in finding that 1911 
rights “typically” incorporated the standard version of the 
1911 regulations, and that these regulations did not impose a 
permit requirement.  Minard Run II, 2009 WL 4937785, at 
*3. 
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Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 196 (1993); Chao v. 
Rothermel, 327 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2003).  Both the 
Settlement Agreement and the Marten Statement are “rules” 
within the meaning of the APA, because they are “agency 
statement[s] of general . . . applicability and future effect 
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”  
5 U.S.C. § 551(4).  The Service argues that both the 
Settlement Agreement and the Marten Statement are not 
substantive rules, but rather “rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice” excepted from the APA‟s notice and 
comment requirement.
13
  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  We 
disagree.   
 
As we have explained: 
Legislative rules are subject to the notice and 
comment requirements of the APA because they 
work substantive changes in prior regulations, 
or create new law, rights, or duties.  . . .  
Interpretative, or procedural, rules do not 
themselves shift the rights or interests of the 
parties, although they may change the way in 
which the parties present themselves to the 
agency. 
                                              
13
 The Service also contends that the decision to 
perform a NEPA analysis is not a “rule” under the APA, but 
this misses point.  Appellees do not object to the Service‟s 
conducting a NEPA analysis; they object only to its 
moratorium on issuing NTPs until the NEPA analysis is 
complete. 
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SBC, Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 497-98 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  The Settlement 
Agreement and the Marten Statement create new duties for 
mineral rights owners:  the purpose and effect of the 
Settlement Agreement and the Marten Statement were to 
prevent new drilling by mineral rights owners during the 
course of a multi-year EIS.  Additionally, in considering 
whether a rule makes “substantive changes in prior 
regulations” or “create[s] new law, rights, or duties,” we 
consider whether the rule will “have a substantive adverse 
impact on the challenging party.”  Chao, 327 F.3d at 227.  
The Service‟s new policy has a “substantive adverse impact” 
on mineral rights owners because it directly interferes with 
their property rights to enter ANF lands and drill for oil and 
gas.  Accordingly, the District Court properly found that 
appellees were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim 
that the Settlement Agreement and the Marten Statement are 
not merely procedural rules, but substantive rules that must be 
promulgated pursuant to the notice and comment procedures 
of the APA. 
 
B.  Irreparable Harm 
The District Court found that the Service‟s moratorium 
on new drilling irreparably harmed appellees because it 
infringed their property rights and threatened bankruptcy or 
closure for some businesses.  The Service argues that the 
District Court‟s finding that some businesses would suffer 
temporary economic losses and might go bankrupt was 
insufficient to establish irreparable harm.  We disagree.  As a 
general matter, “a purely economic injury, compensable in 
money, cannot satisfy the irreparable injury requirement,” 
Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v. GMC, 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d 
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Cir. 1988), but “an exception exists where the potential 
economic loss is so great as to threaten the existence of the 
movant‟s business.”  Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 
587 F.3d 464, 485 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Doran v. Salem 
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932, (1975) (irreparable injury shown 
where business “would suffer a substantial loss of business 
and perhaps even bankruptcy” absent injunctive relief).  Here, 
the District Court carefully considered and ultimately credited 
the testimony of several business owners that the new drilling 
moratorium had dramatically affected their business and 
would probably cause them to shut down or go bankrupt if it 
continued.  Minard Run II, 2009 WL 4937785, at *15-16 
(citing J.A. 971-72, 978-79, 985-88, 1127-36). 
 
Additionally, where “interests involving real property 
are at stake, preliminary injunctive relief can be particularly 
appropriate because of the unique nature of the property 
interest.”  RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1210 
(10th Cir. 2009).
14
  This is particularly true of the mineral 
                                              
14
 Accord Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl 
Scouts of U.S. of Am., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“As a general rule, interference with the enjoyment or 
possession of land is considered „irreparable‟ since land is 
viewed as a unique commodity”); East Tenn. Natural Gas Co. 
v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828-29 (4th Cir. 2004) (excluding 
owner from real property constituted irreparable injury); 
Wonderland Shopping Ctr. Venture Ltd. P’ship v. CDC 
Mortg. Capital, Inc., 274 F.3d 1085, 1097 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(foreclosure causes irreparable injury because it results in loss 
of “unique real property”); Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. City of 
Bridgeport, 180 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1999) (condemnation of 
real property constitutes irreparable harm because condemnee 
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rights at stake in this case.  Under Pennsylvania law, oil and 
gas resources are subject to the “rule of capture,” which 
permits an owner to extract oil and gas even when extraction 
depletes a single oil or gas reservoir lying beneath adjoining 
lands.  Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 
(Pa. 1907).  The adjoining owner‟s only remedy against such 
drainage is to “go and do likewise.”  Id.  The Service‟s 
moratorium on new drilling deprives mineral owners in the 
ANF of this remedy and will cause them to lose oil and gas to 
other landowners drilling on private lands adjoining the ANF, 
which are not subject to the moratorium.
15
  (J.A. 155-56.)  
Therefore, the moratorium also causes irreparable injury to 
mineral rights owners by depriving them of the unique oil and 
gas extraction opportunities afforded them by their mineral 
rights.  See Siegal, 552 F.3d at 1210 (finding irreparable 
injury where interference with property rights caused loss of 
unique opportunities). 
 
C.  The Balance of the Equities and the Public 
Interest 
 
Like the District Court, we consider together the final 
two elements of the preliminary injunction framework – the 
                                                                                                     
has no adequate remedy at law); K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental 
Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 915 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Real estate 
has long been thought unique, and thus, injuries to real estate 
interests frequently come within the ken of the chancellor”). 
15
Because the ANF is not a single continuous piece of 
land – the forest is dotted with numerous private holdings 
(J.A. 155-56, 2258, 2260) – this concern is not limited to 
mineral rights located on the periphery of the forest. 
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public interest and the balance of the equities.  See Nken, 129 
S. Ct. at 1762 (“assessing the harm to the opposing party and 
weighing the public interest . . . merge when the Government 
is the opposing party”).  While the Service has an important 
statutory duty to protect and maintain the natural resources of 
the ANF, the District Court was not required to accept at face 
value its claims that a preliminary injunction will prevent it 
from doing so.  Rather, the court was within its discretion to 
carefully consider the evidence presented by the parties to 
determine whether appellees had shown that the public 
interest favored an injunction.  See id. at 1761; but cf. Winter 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 
377 (2008) (noting the need for special deference to 
“„complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military 
force,‟ which are „essentially professional military 
judgments‟”). 
 
The District Court noted that the Service had 
successfully completed an EIS in 1986 without imposing a 
moratorium on new drilling or suspending the Minard Run I 
framework.  Id. at *6 n.2.  The Service also conceded that this 
framework had adequately protected its interest in preserving 
the environmental resources of the ANF.  Id. at *15 (citing 
J.A. 652-53).  However, the Service contended – and 
appellees vigorously disputed – that there was a recent 
significant increase in drilling in the ANF justifying a 
different approach to the current EIS.  Id. at *14 (citing J.A. 
337-38, 653-54, 1280-81.)  The District Court considered the 
conflicting evidence and found that although the number of 
wells had increased recently, “drilling activity in the ANF is 
somewhat cyclic in nature.”  Id. at *14.  Considered in 
historical context, “the total number of active wells in the 
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ANF immediately preceding the drilling ban was not 
appreciably greater than the number of existing wells in the 
mid-1980s, when the Minard Run [I] framework for 
processing Notices to Proceed was utilized.”  Id.  The Service 
has not challenged this finding on appeal, and it is amply 
supported by the record.   
 
Because the Service could not credibly distinguish the 
present circumstances from the preceding decades in which 
the Minard Run I framework was concededly effective in 
protecting the ANF, it was not clear error for the District 
Court to conclude that a preliminary injunction reinstating 
that framework would not harm the public interest or the 
interests of the Service in preserving the ANF.  By contrast, 
granting the injunction would vindicate the public‟s interests 
in aiding the local economy, see Earth Island Institute v. 
Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 475 (9th Cir. 2010), protecting the 
property rights of mineral rights owners, see 16 U.S.C. 518, 
and ensuring public participation in agency rulemaking as 
required by the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-53.  On the record 
before it, the District Court therefore did not err in finding 
that the balance of the equities and the public interest favored 
injunctive relief. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the 
preliminary injunction entered by the District Court against 
appellants. 
